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CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CROSSKEY
JAMES A. DURIIAM-1
INTRODUCTION
By this time the publication of William Winslow Crosskey's con-
troversial treatise on Politics and the Constitution in the History of
the United States' has been noted with much heat and light in many
newspapers and periodicals 2 as well as in learned journals throughout
the country.3 Among the reviewers have been Senator Paul H. Douglas
of Illinois, Judge Charles E. Clark of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the distinguished commentator for the New York Times,
Arthur Krock, who writes: "And there is evidence that among his
[Crosskey's] earnest students are members of the Supreme Court."
The views of this writer with respect to the significance of the
Crosskey work have been set forth at length in another forum.5 The
purpose of this article is to examine the influence the present volumes
could have, if any, upon the relative power positions of Congress and
the President. This examination becomes pertinent because it has been
implied that Crosskey's thesis places the Legislature in a dangerously
supreme position over the other branches of government, particularly
the Executive. Of course, for present purposes, it is necessary to assume
that Crosskey will gain considerable acceptance-at least in the Congress.
t Washington, D.C. B.A., Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; LL.B. and M.B,.A., Indiana Uni-
versity; Raymond Research Fellow, Univ. of Chicago Law School. Member of the Bars
of Indiana, Kentucky, and the Supreme Court of the United States. The views con-
tained herein do not reflect the position of any agency of the government with which
the writer is or has been associated.
1. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. ix, 1410. $20.00.
2. See Swisher, Saturday Review, April 4, 1953, pp. 33-34; Mettels, Chicago Trib-
une, April 19, 1953, § 4, p. 9; Braden, Louisville Courier-journal, May 17, 1953, § 3,
p. 13; Nevins, New York Times Book Review, May 31, 1953, p. 7; Clark, The Nation,
June 13, 1953, p. 505; Douglas, New York Herald-Tribune Book Review, October 4,
1953, p. 12; Boorstin, Commentary Magazine, December 1953, p. 603; Krock, New York
Times, 'Feb. 16, 1954, p. 24, col. 5.
3. See Braden, 2 KANS. L. REv. 638 (1953) ; Corbin, Braden, 62 YALE L.J. 1137,
1145 (1953); Durham, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (1953); Field, 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1197
(1953); Gooch, 8 READING GuIDE, UNIV. OF VA. LAw LIBRARY 66 (Nov.-Dec. 1953);
Heimann, Kelso, 39 IowA L. Rxv. 138, 149 (1953) ; Jeffrey, 13 LA. L. REV. 638 (1953) ;
Krash, Clark, Hamilton, Fairman, 21 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 1 (1953); Lasswell, 22 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 383 (1954) ; McCloskey, 47 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1152 (1953); Patterson,
32 TEXAS L REvo 251 (1953) ; Peters, 28 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 307 (1953); Ribble, 39
VA. L. REV. 863 (1953) ; Sutherland, 39 CoRNE L. Q. 160 (1954).
4. New York Times, Feb. 16, 1954, p. 24, col. 1.
5. 41 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (1953).
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To summarize the relevant portion of the Crosskey argument: The
Constitution established a national government of comprehensive powers,
with directive power in the Congress. The duty and function of faith-
fully executing the laws, reposed in the President, was designed to fix
responsibility only for the administration of laws passed by the Con-
gress. It is true that the Constitution confers upon the President other
powers: participation in the legislative process through recommendation
of legislation, the veto, and the calling of special sessions; granting of
reprieves and pardons; command of the armed services; and a real law-
making power in the area of foreign relations, subject only to a kind
of Congressional veto by way of the ratification process and appro-
priations.
But by virtue of this enumeration, and the emphasis upon faithful
execution of the laws, Crosskey argues that the Constitution also ef-
fectively erased the notion that any American Executive could ever
legitimately assert that he possessed the powers which Blackstone as-
signed to the Stuarts. Therefore, in Crosskey's view there are to be
found no executive powers other than those enumerated or, to use
terminology in current use, any "inherent executive powers."
THE "MESSENGER Boy" CONCEPT OF THE PRESIDENCY
It will be observed that this emphasis appears to clash with the
conception of a "balanced constitution" which Professor Corwin has
urged.6 This is the view that the Constitution provided a divided legis-
lative initiative between Congress and the Executive and, in addition,
some area for the exercise of executive prerogative. Whether there is
really any substantial de facto conflict between Crosskey and Corwin
may not be clear, but it is certain that the theory of inherent executive
power, which Judge Pine accused the Truman Administration of claim-
ing in the Steel Case,7 has no place in the Crosskey scheme of things.'
Although the thrust of these volumes is to establish Congress over
and above the remainder of the government, Crosskey cannot legiti-
mately be read as proposing to make the President a "messenger boy"
of Congress. Judging by the final reaction on Capitol Hill to Con-
gressman Velde's attempted subpoena of former President Truman,
there is little enthusiasm even in Congress for a return to the ways of
the Johnson administration. In view of his position that the Judiciary
6. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 15-16 (1948).
7. The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. Of course, the old notion of "judicial supremacy" has no place at all in this set-
ting because Crosskey's Supreme Court would be without power to tamper with legisla-
tion unless it invaded the "judicial prerogative."
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and the Executive possess the legitimate power to protect their own
prerogatives, presumably Crosskey would have agreed with Truman.
The "messenger boy" argument, so deftly atttempted by Chief Justice
Vinson to justify Mr. Truman's seizure of the steel mills, 9 apparently
is something of a straw man.
Passing from argument to realities, the enumerated powers of the
President are enormous, and Crosskey recognizes these in full force
and effect. But in addition, by sheer force of "faithful execution of
the laws," that is, by administration, there arises political authority
in the Executive that defies enumeration. The opportunity of setting
over-all governmental objectives, the making of appointments, prepara-
tion of the budget, reports" to the people, issuance of press releases,
dispensation of patronage and government contracts, and financial and
other support which can be given or withheld in local elections through
the party committee controlled by the Executive as well as through
the Presidential office itself are all important assets which a resource-
ful President can employ in a long run contest with Congress. A
vigilant administration not only creates real political power in the
Executive but also diminishes that of the Congress. The farm, labor,
or public power policy pursued by a vigorous Administration actually
tends to limit the legislative decision to one of ratification or rejection.
Some of the criticisms of Crosskey's work are that he does not
recognize the accretion of power that has come to the Executive through
this process of administration. Presumably, this criticism is based
upon a theory that the Constitution has been changed by the trauma of
historical events. Of course, Crosskey does not recognize the concept of
a "growing Constitution" and in fact expressly rejects it.'0 But even
if he did, it is not clear that the Executive as an institution has acquired
powers arising from vigorous administration. In this century only
Wilson and the two Roosevelts have developed political power based
upon full use of the Constitutional powers of the Executive," and
this alone is certainly an insufficient basis from which to argue that
the basic relationship between Congress and the President has been
changed in any permanent or constitutional sense. The ebb and flow
which attaches to this phenomenon suggests that it is personal rather
than institutional.
9. Dissenting in The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667
(1952).
10. A brilliant argument favoring the "growing Constitution" is contained in the
review by Heimann, 39 IowA L. RFv. 138 (1953).
11. See Roche, Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Pre-
rogative, 5 WEST. POL. Q. 592 (1952).
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CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
There also is some feeling that Crosskey's product is objection-
able on the ground that permanently increased Executive power and
permanently diminished Legislative power are in the national interest.
Often value judgments of this character, if repeated frequently enough,
become accepted; the revelation that this has happened so often in the
literature of our constitutional law is one of the great contributions of
Crosskey's volumes. No doubt some of those who are interested in en-
hanced Executive authority feel strongly that the resurgence of Con-
gressional power-particularly by committees-during the Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations has been an unfortunate development. This
perhaps is contrasted with the long Roosevelt administration when a
strong President was able to keep the initiative in Congressional affairs
during the greater part of his tenure. History, too, is an ally to this
type of thinking, for Lincoln, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wil-
son, all believers in what is sometimes called the "stewardship" theory
of the Presidency, are the Executives who have taken the grand places
in the affections of the people.
It is an anomalous historical occurrence that the Presidents who
have come to realize added power through vigorous and imaginative
administration of the laws are the same Executives whose concept of
the national interest, by and large, has been most favorably received
by the American people-not only by their respective generations but
by their descendants as well. In this setting it is easy to absorb the
subconscious, but dangerous, notion that a "strong" President will
also be a "good" President. Very little reflection should suggest that
if this formula should ever fail to carry through, the existence of a
Congress of considerable powers around which men of good will can
rally with hope of success would be a condition precedent to the mainte-
nance of our democratic institutions. This is the other side of the value
judgment as to the desirability of permanently and constitutionally in-
creasing the power of the Executive. This was the value judgment
accepted in 1776 and 1788, which by itself should carry weight with
lawyers.
THE ROTTEN BOROUGH PROBLEM
It has been suggested that the Crosskey thesis is undemocratic
because it may result in the further entrenchment of rural economic
interests to the detriment of urban interests. The argument is that Con-
gress is a rural institution, whereas the Presidcncy and the Judiciary
COMMENTS
are not; therefore, any increase in Congressional power at the expense
of other branches of the government (particularly if the President is
to be a "messenger boy") is bound to result in favorable class legisla-
tion for farmers and laws unfavorable to whatever classes (such as
labor, middlemen, and stock brokers) who may be the current antagon-
ists of the agricultural group.
1 2
The logical implication of this position is that the urban-rural
balance of political power is so out of harmony with what justice
requires in 1954 that urban interests should be given a greater voice
by increasing the power of the President. Perhaps the Steel Case will
one day be cited for the proposition that the imbalance of urban-rural
political power cannot be redressed legitimately by an ascendance of
the Executive at the expense of Congress. In any event, such an oblique
approach to the representation issue could lead to much more serious
problems than having to live with a "rotten borough" Congress.
The fact is that we do have this kind of a Congress, and it fails
to fully reflect the attitudes of the urban society of today. With respect
to the Senate, where equality of geographical representation was written
into the Constitution, the present variations in populations between
states was never anticipated. Today's population difference between
New York and Nevada, for example, is many times greater than the
population difference between the largest and the smallest of the original
states. And, in addition, the number of relatively small populated states
is larger in number today than in 1787. Had the present population
disparities between states prevailed during the ratification campaign, it
is almost inconceivable that the large states would have accepted the
Constitution. Curiously enough, however, over the long run the Senate
has been able to command greater respect from the new urban areas
than the House, to a great extent because the districting system developed
by the Jefferson Party has provincialized the House along rural lines
and has made it less responsive to public opinion.
Considering that this nation is now 64 percent urban,13 the rural
character of the House is somewhat astounding.1 4 And there is no end
12. The assumptioh that the interests of particular nonfarm groups are bound to
clash (and never to coincide) with that of the farm group seems unwarranted, but a
discussion of that interesting subject must be by-passed here.
13. UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, U.S.
SUMMARY xiv (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1952). "An urbanized
area is an area that includes at least one city with 50,000 inhabitants or more in 1940 or
later according to a special census taken prior to 1950 and also the surrounding closely
settled incorporated places and unincorporated areas that meet the criteria listed below.
." Id. at xxiv.
14. Since there is no really accurate way to match metropolitan areas as defined by
the Census Bureau with the actual Congressional districts established by state legisla-
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to the disparity of representation in sight. By hardened custom (some
say by constitutional right) state legislatures determine the size and
boundaries of each Congressional district; and since these legislative
bodies are in turn dominated by rural interests, there is little chance
of urban succor from this source.15 As industrial development and urban-
ization have come to state after state, only slight change at the most,
and usually none at all, has been made in the nonrepresentative character
of the legislatures.' 6 Even if Congress were willing to do its own re-
districting, as Crosskey would have it do, there is no incentive for rural
interests there to surrender voluntarily their power.
This, of course, is the main reason why the Supreme Court has
in recent years been asked to break up this system by requiring some
sort of population equality in the districts of a particular state. How-
ever, as is well known, the Court has repeatedly found this subject
to be a "political" one to be thrashed out in Congress and the state
legislatures,'1 although somehow it was able to find no such "political"
obstacle in ordering the Southern states to return suffrage to the
Negro.' If equal protection of the laws is an applicable principle in
this latter situation, it would appear that the same argument is equally
available in the former. The result is indeed anomalous that the
Supreme Court, which concededly can strike down a state statute for
contravening the Federal Constitution, is forced by its own decisions
to make an exception for state laws establishing unfair representation
in Congress.
tion, comparison is difficult. Reference to Figure 13 and Table 18 of the document cited
in note 13 supra, and to the maps of Congressional districts appearing in 100 CONG. REC.
633-685 (1954) is suggestive of the disparity.
15. The best record is that of New York, which has made slight changes in both
Congressional and Assembly districts in the last few years. In contrast to this, a recent
study of the problem in Missouri, Iowa, and Kansas showed that ". . . the rural blocs
have stubbornly withstood the force of this post-war expansion [in urban population]
and all attempts to shift the representation have been beaten down." New York Times,
January 31, 1954, § 1, p. 63.
16. A recent manifestation of the urban suspicion of rural-dominated state govern-
ments is the opposition expressed by the United States Conference of Mayors to the
tentative proposal of the Council of Governors that the federal government withdraw
from the gasoline taxing field and leave this subject of taxation entirely to the states.
However, since many of the large cities depend upon direct federal grants for highway
construction, it is not surprising that they should be opposed to a tax change which
would force them to look for greater assistance from rural-dominated state legislatures.
New York Times, Feb. 14, 1954, § 1, p. 51.
17. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) ; cf. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276
(1950); see Symposium on Legislative Reapportionment, 17 LAw & CONIEMP. PROB.
253-269 (1952), passim.
18. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
COMMENTS
In this country we have never seriously approached the "rotten
borough" problem which reared its head in England after the industrial
revolution resulted in substantial shifts in population. There are several
obvious reasons for this. When the industrial revolution came to these
shores, the United States was still emerging as a nation, and the vested
interests responsible for continuation of the English rotten boroughs
had not yet arisen in this country. There was -no reason why they
should, for this was still a rural economy into the 20th Century; and
as long as the cheap land of the frontier beckoned, the dominance of
rural attitudes in Congress was assured. Fortunately, the size of the
American Legislature was small, and it was easy to enlarge both of
its Houses as states were added without reducing the representation
of the existing states.
While representation in the Senate was a point of major tension
for many years prior to the Civil War-usually compromised by the
admission of a slave state along with a free state-it was not until
after the conflict between the states that the first significant develop-
ment occurred bearing upon the basis of representation in the House
of Representatives. Thus, the effect of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to increase the size of Southern representation by
counting the Negro as a full person instead of three-fifths of a person
as provided in Section 2, Article I of the original Constitution. This
Amendment was sponsored by the Reconstruction Republicans on the
assumption that Negro suffrage would be guaranteed by troops if
necessary. But one of the consequences of the Hayes-Tilden election
dispute was to effectively disenfranchise the Southern Negro for many
years to come, creating anomalous kinds of racial "rotten boroughs"
all over the South. By the time this disenfranchisement occurred, how-
ever, population growth in the North and West had more than offset
the increased power of the South in the House of Representatives, and,
consequently, this potential crisis was passed.
RURAL CONGRESS AND URBAN EXECUTIVE
But these difficulties had little to do with the political power of
urban and rural interests. It is true that if the rural South had been
denied part of its representation in the House because of the disen-
franchisement of the Negro, as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,19 the power of the other states (only a few of which could then
19. Section 2 of the 14th Amendment is an almost forgotten provision: "... [B]ut
when the right to vote.., is denied.., or in any way abridged ... the basis of repre-
sentation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citi-
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be classified as urban) would have been slightly increased. What dif-
ference, if any, this would have made in the Congressional history
of the late 19th and early 20th Century is problematical since the big
issues which carried the day, such as railroad regulation and antitrust
laws, were supported by great majorities in city and on farm alike.
It was when the House achieved substantial size that the spectre
of "rotten boroughs" based upon population differences arose. In the
twenties, the debate acquired a state versus state flavor, as it does to
some extent yet, with the East and Midwest reluctant to yield to the
burgeoning West. To the older areas of the country, the issue pre-
sented was whether they should use their political power in Congress
to deprive themselves of representation! This power was used to main-
tain the status quo in 1920 when Congress refused -to recognize
Western population growth. It was in this context that the late Senator
Vandenberg had the foresight to sponsor the Reapportionment Act of
1929,20 under which the 435 seats in the House are distributed among
the states automatically on the basis of the decennial census. In hind-
sight it must be conceded that this statute averted serious difficulties
which would have arisen had Congress been forced to deal in 1950
with the representation problem posed by the population increase in
California.
21
In contrast to Congress the Presidency has become, essentially, an
urban institution. While the state legislatures have defied population
shifts, they have almost automatically been recognized in the contest
for control of the national Executive. This is quite understandable.
First of all, the geographical factor is a minor one in the Electoral
College; thus, Nevada's two geographical votes in the Senate of 96
members are vitally important to the passage of a bill, but its two
geographical votes among the 531 electoral votes which are counted
in choosing a President are relatively insignificant. Moreover, the
absence of any district system for choosing electors results in a city
vote being equal to a country vote, and, of course, in an urban state
there are more votes in the cities. In addition to this, the candidate
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State." In 1950, Congressman Case of New Jersey offered an amendment to the Lodge-
Gossett Resolution which would have accomplished this result in the election of the
President. 96 CoNG. REc. A891 (1950).
20. 46 STAT. 26 (1929), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1946).
21. Fortunately, Senator Vandenberg was from Michigan, which as a growing in-
dustrial area stood to gain under the new formula. The Act was passed at a time when
the Republicans had a commanding Congressional majority following the Hoover land-
slide, and in view of the suspicion among Democratic leaders (such as Senator Black)
that the Vandenberg Act was favorable to the Republicans, its passage by the next
Congress (with a Democratic House) would have been improbable.
COMMENTS
(or electors) receiving the most popular votes wins all the electoral
votes of a particular state. Since with few exceptions the heavily popu-
lated states are urban in character, the city dweller in the large states
must necessarily become the object of the affections of any candidate
(and his party) competing for the Presidency.
This system, which places so much power in the great cities in
the heavily populated states, has been the subject of increasing criticism.
The basic argument is simply that this arrangement is unfair to the
rest of the country, including the city dwellers in the small states. If
for no other reason, this criticism is understandable because of the
tendency to assume that rural-dominated political institutions reflect
a just "norm." Of course, the growing influence of the cities in Presi-
dent-making is unfair; but unless the nation is willing to elect a Presi-
dent by popular vote, there seems no way out of the dilemma without
creating greater inequities.
RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS
The most recent and most serious attempt at reform was the Lodge-
Gossett Resolution, which passed the Senate in 1950 but failed to clear
the House. This proposed constitutional amendment would have abol-
ished the system under which the Presidential candidate with the popu-
lar plurality in a state receives all the electoral votes thereof. In place
of this so-called "general ticket" system, the electoral vote of each
state would be apportioned among the candidates in exact ratio to the
popular vote.22 Obviously, this would have destroyed the "pivotal"
character of the heavily populated states and cities since the electoral
vote of New York and California would be split along fairly even lines.
In the future, a Presidential campaign would have to be conducted in
every nook and cranny of the countryside, and the Executive would
be without special obligation to, and pressure from, the heavily popu-
lated urban areas.
There is much to be said for this objective (which would also be
the effect of a popular election of the President), but the Lodge-Gossett
Amendment would have done two other things: First of all, it would
have made almost impossible the election of a Republican President.
The technical reasons why this would be the likely result of the Amend-
22. The proposal also would have abolished the Electoral College itself and would
require a 40 percent plurality of the electoral vote for election. Under this latter pro-
vision which was sponsored by Senator Lucas, if no candidate received 40 percent, then
the House and the Senate, voting as individuals and not by state delegations, would
choose the President from among the two candidates having the most electoral votes.
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ment have been spelled out in detail in a brilliant essay.2 3 Obviously
such a consequence would have damaged the present two-party system
beyond repair (to the extent that this system has vitality), for it is
doubtful that a national party which has no chance to capture the
Presidency can survive today. It is to the everlasting credit of Senator
Taft that he understood this (and persuaded his following in the House
to vote against the Gossett Resolution) when most of the members
of his party in the Senate did not. Rather they adhered to the very
tenuous and speculative argument of Senator Lodge that his Amend-
ment would create a two-party system in the South. The willingness
of the Southern Democrats in both Houses to embrace the Lodge-
Gossett proposal should have alerted the Republicans to the dangers
ahead. Instead, it remained for the House Democrats from the in-
dustrial areas to enter into "a strange coalition"2 4 with the Taft group
to block the proposal in the House. This group feared that the Amend-
ment would help the South (particularly Texas) to take over the Demo-
cratic Party and change its position on labor and racial issues.
The second consequence of the Lodge-Gossett Amendment would
have been the conversion of the Presidency from an essentially urban
to a rural institution. The rural South would have regained its suprem-
acy in the Democratic Party; the Republicans would have been unable
to bid for the Presidency except on the basis of Senator Lodge's long-
shot possibility of turning the South into a two-party area; and to
make this kind of a bid the Republicans would have found it necessary
to appeal to Southern rural economic interests and attitudes.
One Congressman who fully understood the consequences of the
Lodge-Gossett Resolution was Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. of New York.
But, instead of meeting the issue head-on, he offered an amendment
which would have made election of a Republican President almost a
certainty in any closely contested contest. Thus, he sought to replace
the vote-splitting formula of the Gossett Resolution with a system
of choosing electors by Congressional districts plus two electors chosen
by state-wide vote. Since the majority of Congressional districts in
the heavily populated Northern states usually go Republican (even when
the other party carries the same states), this would mean that the
23. Silva, The Lodge-Gossett Resolution: A Critical Analysis, 44 Am. PoL. Sci.
REv. 86 (1950).
24. This was the phrase used by Robert L. Riggs, one of the few newspapermen
who w~s aware of the larger consequences of the Resolution, in the Louisville Courier-
Jour-'al Sunday, March 5, 1950, § 3, p. 3, cols. 1-3.
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Republicans would start with a lead in electoral votes very difficult to
overcome.
2 5
The Coudert proposal also is relevant to the urban-rural political
power balance. Again, in the heavily populated Northern states the
most important voters would be those in the rural and small town
areas, for they elect most of the Congressmen. And if experience
showed that rural interests needed more votes in these states, there
would be nothing to prevent the rural-dominated state legislatures from
gerrymandering a few more districts. Presumably the Supreme Court
would not interfere, under its present decisions, with those "political"
decisions of the states.
Therefore, neither the Lodge-Gossett nor the Coudert formula
would have made any contribution to redressing the imbalance of
political power between urban and rural areas. Even the direct election
of the President will not make our democracy more representative
because the basis of representation in Congress is still the real problem.
And so long as the Supreme Court sides with rural interests in this
matter, as it does by its jurisdictional decisions, the only hope is that
over a period of years attitudes of the South and the West will change
as industrial development occurs in those areas. The rate at which
this process is going on, as a result of production, marketing, and
defense factors, has been particularly marked on the Pacific Coast and
in the TVA Region.
CONCLU*ION
Contrary to statements from some quarters, Crosskey does not
argue for cutting down the power of the Executive to that of a
"messenger boy." While he rejects the theory that the Executive has
acquired (and Congress has lost) new powers through constitutional
growth, his position does not deny the kind of authority which flows
from vigorous administration. This kind of personal Presidential au-
thority is consistent with the words and structure of the Constitutional
document.
Nor can an increase in the powers of the Executive, such as could
have followed a victory for the government in the Steel Case, be
25. This plan was endorsed with great enthusiasm in a series of three articles by
Walter Lippman. Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 6, 1950, § 1, p. 26, col. 1; Mar. 8, 1950, § 1,
p. 30, col. 1; Mar. 10, 1950, § 1, p. 34, col. 1. His basic argument was that the Lodge-
Gossett Resolution adopted the principle of "proportional representation" and, therefore,
was a dangerous precedent. Unquestionably, the Coudert proposal would not encourage
splinter parties.
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justified on the ground that Congress is a rural institution which can-
not accurately reflect the public opinion of our urban society. The
real necessity is to rid Congress of its "rotten borough" complex. In
this connection, Crosskey need not be feared as a source of intellectual
strength for those who would increase the political power of rural
interests. The real -danger is from those who would make the Execu-
tive the representative of the same rural interest groups who elect
the most Congressmen. If the Presidency can remain an urban insti-
tion until such time as the South and the West "catch up" in in-
dustrial development, and this is reflected in the Congress, then we
can afford to place more emphasis upon the method of choosing the
Executive.
